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Abstract The question of constitutional rights within the Chinese legal regime
remains an area of debate and controversy between both Chinese and foreign scholars.
Issues of direct effect and justiciability are still unresolved, much due to the lack of a
formal interpretation that sets out a basis for the understanding of scope and content of
constitutional rights. This has led to the conclusion that constitutional provisions can
only be guaranteed through “transformation” into lower level legislation which is to
be binding upon the organs of state and citizens. This case study explores the right to
liberty of person as stipulated under Article 37 of the constitution as case study,
arguing that while many areas see ample legislative protection, the nature of the legal
system and rights theory in China is vulnerable to arbitrariness and abuse.
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A slow awakening of constitutionalism provides encouragement that the conscious-
ness of rights within China is increasing. Even the government has publicly
acknowledged that rights are to be enjoyed and continues efforts to create a system
of socialist legality—indeed the successful construction of a formalist “socialist
system of laws” was proclaimed during the National People’s Congress (NPC) in
2011.1 However, there are challenges to this claim. China is often criticized for
neglecting or even violating the rights of its citizens: some within the country
even argue that the Chinese legal system does not recognize the existence of rights
as such, or that the legal system is ill equipped to handle human rights claims.
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The Chinese government vehemently opposes such criticism, arguing that the
framework of the Chinese constitution and laws offer ample protection of its
citizens’ rights. Nevertheless, China lacks both a formal interpretation of any
constitutional rights by the legislature2 and an effective constitutional review
mechanism either within the NPC or courts. Consequently, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to say exactly what these guarantees are.
Conventional wisdom in China conjectures that constitutional rights are protected
through general legal procedure rather than constitutional procedure, and one ends
up relying on the strength of lower level legislation for an understanding of the
actual operationalization of constitutional rights.3 In an attempt to shed some light
on constitutional rights, this paper will explore the existing formal framework for
the enjoyment of constitutional rights in China, in light of substantive law and
practice. Considering the rather large catalogue of rights found within the Chinese
constitution, in the following we will make use of the right to liberty of person
(renshen ziyou 人身自由) as stipulated in article 37 of the PRC Constitution as a
case study. A challenge to this choice, however, is that the enjoyment of the right to
liberty of person is met with particular constraints within Chinese legal practice, and
these constraints may not be equally shared by all of the rights within the
Constitution. While this caveat stands, this study aims to demonstrate how Chinese
constitutional rights may be defined, and by way of specific illustrations, provides
observations about constitutional rights in general.
The point of a discussion on liberty of person is not to argue for the abolishment
of all coercive measures employed by the state. However, considering that all legal
systems and traditions are vulnerable to abuse, guarantees against such abuse must
be established, including tests for evaluating the lawfulness, necessity and
proportionality of the deprivation of liberty. As such, the right to liberty of person
as stipulated by inter alia UN International Covenant of Political and Civil Rights
(ICCPR)4 Article 9, similarly with the right to life and right to privacy, does not put
absolute limitations on state authority per se, nor does it “…grant complete freedom
from arrest or detention.”5 As opposed to other rights which prohibit certain state
acts in more absolute terms, such as the prohibition of torture or the absolute nature
of freedom of thought (see e.g. the non-derogable rights in ICCPR Article 4), the
right to liberty of person places an obligation of states to formulate rules,
competencies and procedures under which liberty may be deprived. Thus, the right
to liberty of person is, as it should also be understood within the Chinese formal
legislative context, a procedural right only really prohibiting arbitrary and unlawful
2 There are a number of documents issued by the National People’s Congress and its Standing
Committee, as well as from local People’s Congresses that make interpretative statements on
constitutional provisions, however, none of these statements concern stipulated constitutional rights;
see Zhou 2003, p. 223.
3 Qin and Chen 2004, p. 10.
4 China has so far only signed the ICCPR (1998.10.05) and the treaty is for this reason not binding for
China. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT 1969), China is bound “not to defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty” (VCLT art.18).
5 Joseph et al. 2004, p. 304.
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deprivation of liberty.6 However, the nature of such procedural rights leaves the
formulation of these procedural guarantees up to the state’s discretion, allowing for
a large margin of appreciation. Even to the point where enjoyment of the right is
limited to legal formalism without concern for proportionality and reasonable
justification; an issue, which has often been the object of criticism directed towards
China and its legal regime.7
The first section of this study examines in broad strokes the applicability of the
Chinese constitution, arguing for a possible interpretative coupling between
constitutional rights and lower level legislation. The second section looks at
constitutional rights theory in general. It elaborates on some of the basic premises
for rights guarantees in Chinese constitutional law, including arguments made
within Chinese academic discourse. The section aims at creating a general
framework for the understanding of the subject matter, in particular touching upon
the question of access to remedies as a basic principle of law. Based on these
deliberations, the study then turns to the main argument and body of the work;
making a fairly specific—although not exhaustive—analysis of substantive and
procedural issues regarding the right to liberty of person as formulated in article 37
and reflected in lower level legislation. The third section is followed by observations
related to both constitutional rights in general and on the right to liberty of person in
particular. Throughout the paper individual references to international human rights
treaty law will be made as comparative reflections to the Chinese perspective. These
references are meant to illustrate particularities of the Chinese system, and where
Chinese law and legal practice is challenged by international standards.
The overall focus will mainly be on the legal issues concerning rights-protection
and constitutional development. However, the political nature of the constitution
should perhaps warrant a stronger political orientation in the discussion below, and
there may be many arguments as to why this should be so; the ideological argument
for instrumental use of laws, government intervention in judicial procedure and the
profoundly political nature of the constitution itself. Yet, in the often apparent tug of
war between the legalization and the politicization of justice in China, there is
growing room for legal arguments, and giving more space to these arguments seems
warranted for the sake of taking Chinese law seriously.
1 Sources of law and the scope of study
The focus will mainly rest on the content and scope of national level legislation i.e.
laws drafted and promulgated (zhiding 制定) by the NPC and NPC Standing
Committee (NPCSC), described as “basic law” (jiben falü 基本法律)8 and “law”
6 Nowak 2005, pp. 211–212 and Yue 2007, pp. 60–62.
7 See for instance Potter 1994, pp. 325–358, where much of the discussion on legal formalism remains
descriptive of the Chinese legal reality.
8 Basic law, here as jiben falü (基本法律), is distinct from the basic laws of Hong Kong and Macau, e.g.
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (中华
人民共和国香港特别行政区基本法), adopted 4 April 1990.
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(falü 法律) respectively.9 Following the Constitution10 and provisions of the PRC
Legislation Law (2000, LL), no national administrative rules and regulations, issued
by the State Council (LL Article 56), or local or autonomous regulations, or special
rules (LL Article 63) may conflict with either constitutional provisions or national
level legislation, thus justifying the relatively narrow legislative focus in this study.
However, we will find that there are administrative rules and procedures in place
that may impinge upon the enjoyment of the right in question and accordingly, a
closer look is warranted—particularly at those, which actually conflict with higher
level legislation.
Chinese jurisprudence on legislative implementation generally requires basic rights
to be enforced through lower level legislation as applied by the courts.11 This
realization through the courts includes: rendering judgments (panjue判决), publish-
ing court bulletins (tongzhi通知), andmaking judicial interpretations (sifa jieshi司法
解释), which again include general legal interpretations, formulated either as
interpretations (jieshi解释) or rules (guiding规定), opinions (yijian意见, or “guiding
opinions” zhidao yijian 指导意见), and “replies” (i.e. pifu 批复, dafu 答复, fuhan
复函, jieda 解答, etc.). These “replies” are responses to questions by lower courts
addressed to higher-level courts regarding the application of law in specific cases.12
Although not legally binding they have a significant advisory effect and are widely
published and cited in cases other than the case of the originating questions, effectively
being de facto general judicial interpretations on the application of law. An analogy of
this advisory mechanism may be a parallel of the advisory functions of the EU Court.
The most influential of these replies with regard to the justiciability of the
constitution is the 1955 Supreme People’s Court reply (fuhan 附函) to Xinjiang
High Court, advising against the direct application of the constitution in the
determination of guilt and sentencing (lunzui kexing论罪科刑) of criminal cases.13
This bar on the application of the constitution was later extended also to civil and
economic cases in a 1986 reply (pifu批复) from the SPC to Jiangsu High Court, de
facto barring any direct application of the constitution in Chinese courts.14
However, there are arguments that this understanding of the two documents is
9 中华人民共和国立法法 (PRC Legislation Law, hereafter LL) 1 July 2000, art. 7. English translations
of legal texts are provided through the NPC Law Database (http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/english/
law/lawDBSearch.jsp), other sources will be specified. All translated quotes of other Chinese texts are my
own unless otherwise specified.
10 中华人民共和国宪法 (PRC Constitution, hereafter Constitution), 12 April 1982, last amended 14
March 2004, art. 5, para. 3.
11 Zhang 1999, p. 224 and Xu 1999, p. 148.
12 There may be similarly titled advisory opinions forthcoming from other ministries and government
organs, however, in the following text, the focus will only be on the judicial “replies”.
13 最高人民法院关于在刑事判决中不宜援引宪法作论罪科刑的依据的复函 (Supreme People’s Court
reply regarding inappropriate citation of the constitution as a source for determination of guilt and sentencing
in criminal verdicts), 30 July 1955.
14 最高人民法院关于人民法院制作法律文书如何引用法律规范性文件的批复 (Supreme People’s
Court reply regarding how to incorporate normative documents in drafting legal documents by the People’s
Courts), 28 October 1986.
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exceedingly narrow and that they should not preclude constitutional cases, in any
way. While the former only bars the application of the constitution in the
“determination of guilt and sentencing” of criminal cases, and not other use of the
constitution15; the latter document only prohibits the direct use of the constitution
through omission as the Constitution is not listed among the permissible sources of
law. Similar antithetical arguments towards the lack of reference to the Constitution
in the listing of applicable legislation in criminal, civil and administrative
procedure,16 are in other cases made as evidence towards the non-justiciability of
the Constitution.17 However, these arguments towards exhaustive legislative
enumeration are challenged by court practice, and at the same time allow some
to argue that the prohibition is resting on a weak foundation.18 Several interpretative
statements by the SPC over the years specifically invoke constitutional provisions
and rights, e.g. two 1988 SPC replies (pifu批复) making a constitutional argument
in favor of worker’s rights,19 and a joint 1999 SPC and Ministry of Justice notice
(tongzhi 通知) on equality before the law in relation to legal aid in civil cases.20
Indeed, there are also a number of cases to be found where the courts actually
make use of either general constitutional arguments,21 or specific application of
15 Wang 2000, p. 20.
16 中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法 (PRC Criminal Procedure Law, hereafter CPL), 17 March 1996, arts.
182 and 189; 中华人民共和国民事诉讼法 (PRC Civil Procedure Law, hereafter CivPL), 9 April 1991,
arts. 138 and 153; 中华人民共和国行政诉讼法 (PRC Administrative Litigation Law, hereafter ALL) 4
April 1989, arts. 52 and 53.
17 夏捷 (Xia J) 对法院在案件审理中适用宪法的几点思考 (On the Use of the Constitution in Court
Judgements) http://www.njfy.gov.cn/site/boot/jlfy-mb_a2005112442683.htm Accessed 12 April 2011.
18 Hu 2002, p. 150.
19 最高人民法院关于雇工合同“工伤概不负责”是否有效的批复 (Supreme People’s Court Reply
regarding whether [the clause] “work injury will not be the responsibility [of the employer]” in
employment contracts is valid), 14 October 1988; and the case张连起、张国莉诉张学珍损害赔偿纠纷
案 (Zhang Lianqi, Zhang Guoli v. Zhang Xuezhen), 24 December 1988, 塘沽区人民法院 (Tangku
District People’s Court, Tianjin Municipality). This case is a bit peculiar as two replies with different
wording were issued by the SPC regarding this case, cf.最高人民法院关于雇工合同应当严格执行劳动
保护法规问题的批复 (Supreme People’s Court reply regarding the strict implementation of labor
protection laws and regulations in employment contracts) 14 October 1988.
20 最高人民法院,司法部关于民事法律援助工作若干问题的联合通知 (Supreme People’s Court and
the Ministry of Justice joint notice regarding some questions concerning legal aid in civil cases), 22
September 2005; cited in Zhou 2003, p. 250. Notice also found at http://www.sft.yn.gov.cn/details.asp?
ARTID=1062&COLID=153 Accessed 5 February 2008.
21 See, inter alia,沈涯夫、牟春霖诽谤案 (Du Rong v. Shen Yafu and Mu Chunlin), 29 June 1987,上
海市长宁区人民法院 (Changning District People’s Court, Shanghai); 王红军不服阆中市公安局治安
管理处罚决定案 (Wang Hongjun v. Langzhong Public Security Bureau), 12 August 1999, 四川省南充
市中级人民法院 (Nanchong City Intermediate People’s Courty, Sichuan Province); 张连起, 张国莉诉
张学珍损害赔偿纠纷案 (Zhang Lianqi, Zhang Guoli v. Zhang Xuezhen), 24 December 1988,塘沽区人
民法院 (Tangku District People’s Court, Tianjin Municipality); 王发英诉刘真及《女子文学》等四家
杂志侵害名誉权纠纷案 (Wang Faying v. Liu Zhen and Four Magazines Including Women’s Literature),
6 May 1989,河北省高级人民法院 (High People’s Court of Hebei Province);宜昌市无线电厂诉卢玲等
四人终止劳动合同纠纷案 (Yichang Radio Factory v. Lu Ling et al.), 8 December 1999,宜昌市中级人
民法院 (Yichang Intermediate People’s Court, Hubei) in中华人民共和国最高法院公报 (Gazette of the
PRC Supreme People’s Court) 2000, No.6, 68 pp. 205–207; Donnelly 2003 and Chow 2003.
The right to liberty of person 39
123
constitutional articles22 as justification of decisions. There are also other recent
studies in China that point to cases, judicial interpretations and replies where the
constitution is directly referenced by the courts as a source of law.23 This assertion
stands in stark contrast with the official emphasis on the non-justiciability of the
constitution.24
It has been noted, however, that constitutional provisions will never constitute the
sole legal basis of a judgment, unless there are legislative lacunae that needs to be
filled. In these cases the constitutional citation must be accompanied by a
corresponding judicial interpretation, e.g. a SPC pifu (批复).25 This thesis is largely
based on the experience from the “Qi Yuling Case” (齐玉苓案, 2001), where a SPC
reply made sole use of a constitutional provision—Article 46 on the right to
education—as normative background, was issued. This reply was then used directly
by the local High People’s Court as justification for its appeal decision, along with
the constitutional provision, as the only substantive norm. Although this was hailed
as a landmark case at the time, it did not invite an increase of cases making sole use
of the constitution as a basis for litigation, and should probably be considered as an
exception to, rather than a development of court practice.26 The SPC withdrawal of
the “Qi Yuling Case (齐玉苓案)” interpretation in a December 2008 decision leaves
little doubt about the controversial nature of this case, and of constitutional cases in
general.27 Leaving an option where in cases where there is adequate lower level
legislation, any reference to constitutional norms must be coupled with the
corresponding legislation.28
These cases and interpretations raise a number of interesting questions with
regard to the role of the constitution in judicial processes in China, and we see that
“constitutional cases” are not as rare as previously thought.29 The coupling of
constitutional norms and lower level legislation also describes the close relationship
22 See, inter alia,刘明诉铁道部第二十工程局二处第八工程公司、罗友敏工伤赔偿案 (Liu Ming vs.
the No. 8 Engineering Company of Division No. 2 of the No. 20 Engineering Bureau of the Ministry of
Railways and Luo Youmin), 17 May 2001, 四川省眉山地区中级人民法院 (Meishan Prefecture
Intermediate People’s Court, Sichuan Province) in 中华人民共和国最高法院公报 (Gazette of the PRC
Supreme People’s Court) 1999, No.5, 61, pp.172–173. Constitution art. 41 (2); 龙建康诉中洲建筑工程
公司、姜建国、永胜县交通局损害赔偿纠纷案 (Long Jiankang v. Zhongzhou Construction Engineer-
ing Co., Ltd.,), 11 April 2000, 云南省永胜县人民法院 (Yongsheng County People’s Court, Yunnan
Province). Constitution art.42(4); 齐玉苓诉陈晓琪等以侵犯姓名权的手段侵犯宪法保护的公民受教
育的基本权利纠纷案 (Qi Yuling v. Chen Shaoqi et al.), 23 August 2001, 山东省高级人民法院 (High
People’s Court of Shandong Province). Constitution art.46 (1).
23 Zhou 2003, Wang 2004 and Han 2005.
24 Hand 2009.
25 Zhou 2003, p. 199.
26 Anecdotal evidence tells of political repercussions after the conclusion of this case, eventually leading
to a reemphasis of the prohibition to cite the constitution in court.
27 最高人民法院关于废止 2007 年底以前发布的有关司法解释(第七批)的决定 (Decision of the
Supreme People’s Court on Abolishing the Relevant Judicial Interpretations (the Seventh Batch)
Promulgated before the End of 2007), 18 December 2008. See also Chinese Law Prof Blog, 2009.01.12,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2009/01/supreme-peoples.html Accessed 13 Jan-
uary 2009.
28 Zhou 1999.
29 For a discussion on the dynamics of the existing constitutional cases see Malmgren (forthcoming).
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between constitutional basic rights and law. Although this study has not found cases
that make the full connection between Article 37 and lower level legislation, a
general principle of coupling constitutional provisions and law has been sufficiently
established to allow the use of related cases and legislation as interpretative tools for
the right in question.30
2 The nature of constitutional rights
Quite like constitutional debates elsewhere, complaints from within the Chinese
academic community claim that a common understanding of what a constitution is
and on the nature of basic constitutional rights is yet to be established, and that this
is detrimental to the justiciability of the constitution.31 However, there are areas in
which a basic consensus seems to exist.
Although Chinese law arguably has largely been removed from ideological
constraints in the attempt to introduce a Weberian “rational” law,32 jurisprudence
and in particular the constitutional rights theory seem to retain much of the
ideological vocabulary. The principle of the reciprocal nature of basic constitutional
rights and obligations (yizhixing 一 致性 or tongyixing 统一性), found not only
within Marxist theory but also amply demonstrated under early writing on rights in
China,33 usually described as the “unity of rights and duties,”34 extends the direct
limiting nature of constitutional provisions to citizens and not only to state organs—
i.e. giving constitutional rights a direct horizontal effect.
Apart from a number of cases involving officials as defendants, and where a
rights argument would be proper,35 this principle is apparent in available case-law
on deprivation of liberty where the verdict often makes the use of a rights language
that the defendant has “violated the right to liberty of person of X” (qinfan le X de
30 These “constitutional cases”, however, make it plausible that a challenge or decision implicating art.
37 could be made, if it has not been made already. For example, in the Lin Shuchao case (林树潮案) the
court makes a direct reference to the constitutional right to liberty of person while discussing the severity
of the Reeducation through labour (RETL) regime (“the highest form of administrative punishment”).
However, the verdict does not make any further reference to lower level legislation. The case does
establish, however, that the Hainan Intermediate People’s Court believes RETL to be within the scope of
constitutional inquiry. (林树朝不服海南省劳动教养管理委员会劳动教养决定案) (Lin Shuchao v.
Hainan Province Reeducation through labour Management Committee), 1999, 海口市中级人民法院
(Haikou City Intermediate People’s Court, Hainan Province), Wang 2005b, p. 76.
31 Lin 2000, p. 3 and pp. 42–44.
32 Chen 2008, p. 50.
33 See e.g. 刘师培 (Liu Shipei) 1905, 伦理教科书 (Textbook on Ethics), excerpts translated in Angle
and Svensson 2001, p. 37.
34 Chen 1999, p. 92 and Chen 2008, p. 133 where the argument remains the same.
35 See e.g. 郝志敏不服青岛市、徐州市公安局限制其子罗军谊人身自由行政决定案 (Hao Zhimin v.
Qingdao City and Xuzhou City Public Security Bureau), 28 December 1993, 江苏省高级人民法院
(High People’s Court of Jiangsu Province);陈德光等诉琼山市公安局等治安一案 (Chen Deguang et al.
v. Qiongshan Public Security Bureau et al.), 15 March 2000,海南省高级人民法院 (High People’s Court
of Hainan Province); 张树荣申请国家赔偿案 (Zhang Shurong Case), 14 April 2000, 北京市海淀区人
民法院 (Haidian District People’s Court, Beijing; 曹建东申请国家赔偿案 (Cao Jiandong case),
19 December 2001, 北京市石景山区人民法院 (Shijingshan Distict People’s Court, Beijing) (All cases
on file with author).
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renshen ziyouquan 侵犯了某某的人身自由权).36 This has the effect of basically
rendering criminal acts between citizens as a violation of rights, sometimes even
using the term “citizens’ rights” (gongmin de quanli 公民的权利). The principle
makes reference to the formulation that “there are no rights without obligations, and
there are no obligations without rights”37 and that “in order to enjoy rights, one
should shoulder corresponding obligations; and in fulfilling one’s duties, one will be
given to enjoy corresponding rights.”38 The latter statement makes it fairly clear that
emphasis of the relationship between rights and obligations lies on the latter. In this
vein it has been argued that the citizen’s obligations actually are the state’s rights,39
or at least that state interests takes precedence over individual’s rights.
To render citizen’s rights and state power equal, turns the constitution into a
direct means of limiting the actions of an individual, and in this way loses its
function of balancing citizens’ rights and state power.40 One may even argue that
the state is placing itself above the constitution by projecting constitutional duties
upon the individual. The problem of a direct horizontal effect of constitutional rights
and duties is very far from unique to China, and the many questions that the issue
poses have few—if any—readily available answers.41 Chinese jurisprudence seems,
however, to accept this notion without much debate. Human rights debates outside
China have made the link between communitarian rights arguments, where the
protection of the many against the acts of the few is emphasized, and rendering
rights and obligations on a horizontal level—thus weakening the position of the
individual within the national framework of rights.42 Similarly we may make the
same argument regarding constitutional rights in China; the individual has been the
weaker part in any discourse on rights, both in theory and practice, and the state has
been arguing for the legitimacy of limiting the rights of individuals in the interest of
the “communal”, whether it be the society, state or masses.
This is confirmed in legal practise. While it is held that “all people” should enjoy
the right to protection from infringements or unreasonable restrictions by the state
and state representatives43; state interests are placed before individual’s rights
36 See e.g. 夏献法诉深圳市曼哈商业有限公司侵犯人身自由权、名誉权案 (Xia Xianfa v. Shenzhen
Manha Trading Ltd.), 16 May 1996, 广东省深圳市中级人民法院 (Shenzhen Intermediate People’s
Court, Guangdong Province); 张玉刚非法拘禁案 (Zhang Yugang case), 1 February 2007, 北京市顺义
区人民法院 (Shunyi District People’s Court, Beijing); 张韬故意杀人、非法拘禁,奚大震非法拘禁、
包庇,胡宇非法拘禁,姜广毅包庇上诉案 (Zhang Tao et al. appeals case), 14 December 2000,北京市高
级人民法院 (Beijing Intermediate People’s Court);黄永柱非法拘禁案 (The Case of Huang Yongzhu’s
Unlawful Detainment), 18 September 2000,海口市振东区人民法院 (Zhendong District People’s Court,
Haikou City); 吉普色合非法拘禁案 (Ji Pu Se He case), 19 May 2000, 四川省普格县人民法院 (Puge
County People’s Court, Sichuan Province); 周勇等故意伤害、抢劫、敲诈勒索、寻衅滋事、非法拘
禁、非法持有、私藏枪支弹药案 (Zhou Yong et al. case), 9 November 2001,四川省泸州市中级人民
法院 (Luzhou City Intermediate People’s Court, Sichuan Province).
37 Makesi Engesi xuanji [Selected Works of Marx and Engels], Vol.2, 137, cited in Dong 2004: 269.
38 Xie 1999, pp. 53–54.
39 Zhou 2001, p. 278.
40 Zhang 2004, p. 28.
41 See e.g. Tushnet 2003, pp. 79–98.
42 Emberland 2006.
43 Xie 1999, p. 33.
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through Article 51, which covers among other matters, the limitation of basic rights
based on the interests of the state, society and the collective, making effective and
actual limitations on state powers questionable.44
There is also a general consensus in the affirmation that both traditional Chinese
political theory and socialist theory emphasize harmonious relations between the
state and individual.45 As such the perceived necessity for the existence of personal
rights is very small.46 According to a Chinese commentary this does not mean that
necessity and existence of rights was negated in Marxist theory,47 but that these
rights exist only as citizen’s rights stipulated by law, rather than as inherent or
natural human rights.48
When defining the scope and content of basic civil rights, it is often claimed that
the political, economical and cultural level of development of the state, while in “the
beginning stage of socialism”, must be fully considered.49 This differentiated and
selective rights theory is not unique to the post-1949 legal discourse in China, as
Angle and Svensson explain on the writings of Wu Jingxiong (John Wu, 吴经熊)
from 1933; “[rights] are not universal, but have to suit the times and the needs of
each individual society.”50 Equating this rights discourse with constitutional rights
theory, it is implied that different from other Chinese constitutional norms, the
broadening, narrowing, or any other development of the citizen’s basic rights is
dependent upon concrete, pressing national needs.
Examples of such needs are the inclusion of the clause stating that “personal
dignity … is inviolable,”51 which was added to the 1982 Constitution as a direct
consequence of the Cultural Revolution.52 Another situation relates to when the
right to freedom in choosing a place of abode and the freedom of movement as
stipulated in the 1954 Constitution was abolished, which was thought justified as it
was not considered possible to adjust life and production caused by a high
concentration of people in the big cities.53 The recent constitutional revisions on
economy and economic reform (1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004), property (1988 and
2004), rule of law (1999) and human rights (2004) may well be perceived as
reflections of the same instrumental nature of the constitution.
44 Chen 1999, p. 93.
45 Peerenboom 2002, pp. 78–79.
46 Angle 2002, pp. 201–202, note footnote 22 on p. 202.
47 Xia 2001, p. 207.
48 Svensson 2002, p. 23 and Lin 2007, p. 80.
49 Xie 1999, p. 53.
50 Angle and Svensson 2001, p. 161, Wu Jingxiong later took a small part in the drafting process of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights along with the more famous Zhang Pengchun (张彭春, P.C.
Chang) Morsink 1999, 103.
51 中华人民共和国宪法 (1982) (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1982), 4 December
1982, art.38: “中华人民共和国公民的人格尊严不受侵犯。 …”(The personal dignity of citizens of
the People’s Republic of China is inviolable. …)
52 Zhou 2001, p. 283.
53 Dong 2004, p. 296.
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Finally, the jurisprudence on rights in China proposes that citizen’s basic rights
are provided by the state,54 and the responsibility of the state to guarantee or
safeguard (baozhang 保障) these rights have seen a long-standing recognition in
Chinese academia.55 It was not until the 2004 revision of the Constitution and the
inclusion of “the state respects and guarantees human rights”56 as a new third
paragraph in Article 33, that this principle received a firmer formulation within the
constitution.57 However, this amendment did more than just reaffirm a principle, the
revision clarified two levels of state responsibilities in guaranteeing basic rights;
First, “the state respects…human rights” implies a passive, or negative obligation,
only requiring the non-action or non-interference of the state58; Second, “the state…
guarantees human rights” implies active, or positive obligations to ensure the
enjoyment of a right either through legislation, or through other protective or
coercive means, as was held also before the amendment.59 This amendment mimics
the language and structure of obligations in both international human rights law, e.g.
ICCPR Article 2 (1), as well as formulations in other national constitutions, such as
the Norwegian Constitution Article 110c.
The legislative responsibility of the state is to protect basic rights in two areas:
first, it will generally provide valid legal guarantees that basic rights will not be
violated by state organs; second, legislation should also provide individuals with
guarantees for remedies against unlawful acts by other private individuals or
entities60—which can be understood as an indirect horizontal effect of rights
obligations, a notion which is far more commonly accepted than the above
discussed direct horizontal effect of constitutional provisions. Indeed, rights
protection through legislative acts and lawful remedies are necessary parts of the
obligations of state under international human rights law. In this regard one
important underlying principle should be considered; access to effective remedies.
2.1 Remedies
Access to a remedy (jiuji 救济) in case of rights infringements carries the greatest
significance in guaranteeing rights,61 yet in the language of Article 37 no such
admission is directly made with regard to unlawful deprivation of liberty. However,
article 41 creates the option of a right to remedy violations against any right
stipulated by the constitution or law, where the first and second sentence of Article
41(1) formulates the basic right to bring forth complaints on rights violations
54 Li 1999, p. 128.
55 Quanguo renda changweihui bangongting yanjiushi zhengzhi zu 1996, p. 143.
56 “国家尊重和保障人权” (The state respects and guarantees human rights).
57 Constitution (2004), art.24.
58 Jiao 2004, p. 46.
59 Ibid., p. 47; Zhou 2003, p. 4.
60 Lin 2007, p. 96.
61 Liu 2003, p. 52.
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committed by state organs (including the executive, administrative, judicial and
supervisory organs on all levels of the state) or by the representatives thereof
(including all state organs leadership and ordinary employees).62 The complaints
mechanisms involved include submitting criticisms and suggestions, appeals, or to
bring forth charges with regard to violations of law or dereliction of duty.
However, the third sentence of Article 41 (1) renders rather a broad limitation in
that “…fabrication or distortion of facts or for purposes of libel and false
incrimination is prohibited.”63 This limitation is also found within the Criminal Law
(CL),64 and considering the experiences through other similarly formulated
limitations regarding evidentiary rules and judicial procedure, and the difficulties
associated in establishing the facts of a case and possibilities for government
interference in adjudication,65 one could imagine this formulation would create
rather large possibilities for the state organs involved to refute any charge brought
against them, and probably has a chilling effect on those wanting to take their claims
to court. This should also be seen along with the challenges posed under sub-
paragraph 2 of this article.
Article 41(2) formulates the duty of the relevant state organs, including
competent administrative authorities, public security organs, judicial organs,
including the Procuratorate,66 to hear appeals, charges or reports brought forth by
citizens. This paragraph renders a duty for state organs to investigate and handle any
complaint, and in this way further protects citizens’ right to appeal. The constitution
forbids any form of repression or revenge (baofu 报复) towards the person issuing
the complaint. However, recent studies and news reports on the plight of protesters
and the challenges they face when trying to put forth complaints,67 despite the
prohibitions and limitations set by CL Article 254 on abuse of powers and similar
CCP regulations,68 indicate that the actual enjoyment of a right to a remedy against
rights violations may be deeply challenged.69
62 Quanguo renda changweihui bangongting yanjiushi zhengzhi zu 1996, p. 168. See also中华人民共和
国刑法(PRC Criminal Law, hereafter CL), 14 March 1997, art.93.
63 Constitution (2004), art.41, para. 2.
64 CL, art.243; Zhou 2001, p. 268.
65 Lubman 1999, pp. 263–269. On the difficulties faced by lawyers in relation to art.306(3) and the
question of coercing or enticing a witness into changing a testimony in defiance of the facts or give false
testimony and the provisions used as a “tool” by the prosecution and the court;周汉基 (Zhou H),废止危
害律师执业权之法条 (Abolishing provisions that jeopordise lawyers right to practise the law)
http://www.hanjilawyer.com.cn/meiye/yue6-02.htm.
66 Quanguo renda changweihui bangongting yanjiushi zhengzhi zu 1996, p. 169; Here the “judiciary” is
limited to the People’s Courts and the People’s Procuratorate, there are however, arguments towards a
much broader definition of the term, including the police, state security organs and even lawyers etc., see
Chen 2004, p. 131.
67 See e.g. Human Rights Watch 2005.
68 Liu 1991, p. 46.
69 See O’Brien and Li 2006, Chen and Wu 2006; China courts turn deaf ear to peasants’ cases, The New
York Times, 27 December 2005 (Accessed 28 December 2007); 中华人民共和国人民法院组织法
(Organic Law of the People’s Courts) 31 October 2006; Seeking justice, dodging capture in Beijing, L.A.
Times, 28 May 2007 (Accessed 29 May 2007).
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Article 41(3) stipulates a general right to compensation for rights violations. This
right has been further elaborated on in lower level legislation through e.g. State
Compensation Law (SCL, 1994) and Administrative Litigation Law (ALL, 1989),
Article 67.70 With regard to the question of liberty of person, the scope for seeking
compensation covers an act committed by any executive organ, or its functionaries,
and cases of wrongful arrest. Detention or other forms of deprivation of liberty falls
under the scope of administrative, criminal or civil compensation.71 There is,
however, no applicable rule in the case of violations to the constitution, leaving it up
to lower level legislation to foresee possible compensation needs. But then again, the
above mentioned Qi Yuling case serves as an exception by awarding compensation
to be paid by three public institutions (two schools and the local educational
committee). It should be noted that this was a civil law case, and compensation was
given for the expressed violation of the plaintiff’s right to education.72 Whether or
not this will eventually set a precedent, which permits compensation for violations
that fall outside the scope of lower legislation, is far from clear.
3 Right to liberty of person as a constitutional right
The right to liberty of person may be perceived as a rather broad rights category,
some include issues of human dignity, physical freedom, freedom of marriage,
safety of home and residence,73 while others believe that it should also include
freedom and privacy of correspondence.74 Yet others argue that the right to
reputation and the right to privacy should be added as well.75
The scope of liberty of person will be limited to the liberty or right to physical
freedom (renshen ziyou 人身自由) as outlined in the language of article 37, which
establishes the inviolable (bu shou qinfan 不受侵犯) right of citizens to liberty of
person (para. 1); Paragraph 2 is limited to defining the scope of legal arrest (daibu
逮捕) and; Paragraph 3 stipulates a general prohibition against violations of
citizen’s liberty of person, the acts that fall within the scope of this right, apart from
arrest, include detention, deprivation or restriction of citizens’ freedom, and body
searches.76 The question is how to define and understand the rather broad terms of
the provision.
70 中华人民共和国国家赔偿法(PRC State Compensation Law, hereafter SCL), 12 May 1994; Zhou
2001, p. 268.
71 Deng 2000.
72 齐玉苓诉陈晓琪等以侵犯姓名权的手段侵犯宪法保护的公民受教育的基本权利纠纷案 (Qi Yuling
v. Chen Xiaoqi et al.) See verdict rendered by Shandong Province High Court pt.3.
73 Xie 1999, p. 145.
74 Xu 1996, pp. 416–420.
75 Zhou 2003, pp. 151–156.
76 Quanguo renda changweihui bangongting yanjiushi zhengzhi zu 1996, p. 161.
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“Article 37: Freedom of the person of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable.
No citizens may be arrested (daibu逮捕), except with the approval (pizhun批准) or by decision (jueding
决定) of a People’s Procuratorate or by decision of a People’s Court, and arrests must be made (zhixing
执行) by a public security organ.
Unlawful (feifa 非法) detention (jujin 拘禁) or deprivation (boduo 剥夺) or restriction (xianzhi 限制)
of citizens’ freedom of the person by other means is prohibited, and unlawful search (feifa soucha
非法搜查) of the person of citizens is prohibited.”
3.1 The legal subjects
The first paragraph constitutes the main formulation of a right and to whom this
right is addressed. As with most of the rights within the Chinese constitution, and
following the tradition of many of the world’s constitution, the text of article 37
only provides for the rights of “citizens”. However, considering the development of
domestic Chinese law through, inter alia, the state responsibilities shouldered
through the ratification of international human rights instruments, and as we saw
above, the inclusion of the term “human rights” into the constitution, the scope of
subjects enjoying the right to liberty of person may be understood in a broader sense
than in the past.77
Article 33, para. 1 reads: “All persons holding the nationality (guoji国籍) of the
People’s Republic of China are citizens (gongmin公民) of the People’s Republic of
China [sic].” The term is further elaborated in the 1980 Nationality Law (NL);
persons eligible for Chinese citizenship include: 1. Any person born in China or
abroad who can show that either one or both parents is a Chinese national,
regardless of “nationality” (minzu 民族).78 This does not apply if one or both
parents has permanent abode (dingju 定居) in a foreign country and the newborn
obtains a foreign nationality at birth.79 This provision follows the principle that
China does not recognize dual citizenships.80 However, as has for example been
seen in a 2007 extradition case of a suspected terrorist, the politics behind the
recognition of foreign citizenships of former Chinese nationals by the Chinese
government seems to be rather inconsistent81; 2. Any person born in China whose
parents are stateless or of uncertain nationality with fixed abode in China82;
3. Foreign nationals and stateless persons willing to abide by China’s Constitution
and laws, may apply for and obtain Chinese citizenship provided the applicant is a
77 Han 2006, p. 136 and Chen 2008.
78 中华人民共和国国籍法 (PRC Nationality Law, hereafter NL), 10 September 1980, art.2. In Chinese
the term minzu (民族), confusingly translated to “nationality”, although it normally points to the ethnic
classifications of the peoples of China.
79 Ibid., arts.4 and 5.
80 Ibid., art.3.
81 Canada angry at Uighur sentence, BBC News, 20 April 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
asia-pacific/6574517.stm (Accessed 3 June 2007); Amnesty International, China: Canadian Uighur
sentenced to life in prison www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA17/018/2007/en, 19 April 2007.
82 NL (1980), art.6.
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near relative of a Chinese person (Zhongguo ren中国人), has permanently settled in
China, or has other legitimate reasons.83
In listing the subjects of basic rights, Chinese constitutional theory often focuses
on the term “particular subjects” (teding zhuti 特定主体), referring to persons who
are specifically pointed out in the constitution to enjoy particular rights, e.g. women
and children,84 overseas Chinese,85 or members of national minorities.86 The
language of the constitutional provision on liberty of person is phrased in general
terms without mention of any particular group of people beyond citizens. However,
looking at statutes on the status of state organ personnel, we find that there are
groups that do enjoy an additional level of protection, e.g. NPC delegates (discussed
below). Such additional levels of protection or degrees of immunity, for members of
legislatures are quite common in many jurisdictions, e.g. France, Brazil or the
Czech Republic.
4 “Arrest”
Paragraph 2 of Article 37 only relates to the procedural guarantees qualifying a
lawful arrest (daibu 逮捕). This term must be understood as an “autonomous
concept”—to borrow from the European human rights terminology—in the sense
that its meaning reflects a very specific form of deprivation of liberty that differs
from the common use of the term under most other national jurisdictions. Whereas
“juliu拘留” (detention) may be understood in a conventional way, the term “daibu
逮捕”cannot. Different from the term under international treaty law, or common
use, where both “arrest” and “detention” describes any act of deprivation of liberty
by an authorized government organ or personnel (including holding mentally ill
83 Ibid., art.7. Mo Jihong has argued that following the 2004 inclusion of “human rights” into the
constitution, rights should be made equally applicable to all, and that this amendment was a continuance
of a trend under the 1982 constitution to recognize foreigners as subjects of the rights enumerated in the
document (Mo 2005, p. 148). On another hand, the limitation of the enjoyment of rights to “citizens”,
with the exceptions of art.32 regarding the protection of the lawfully given rights and duties of foreigners
within China’s borders, and art.50 on foreign ethnic Chinese, has been suggested to reflect a general view
that foreigners cannot make claims against constitutional basic rights (citizen’s rights) that are not
explicitly formulated as such (Zhou 2003, p. 27). Others, while inferring that Chinese constitutional rights
are indeed human rights, invoke art.32 of the constitution to extend the scope of basic constitutional rights
well beyond the “citizen” (Liu et al. 1999, p. 6). A possible understanding of this would be a
differentiation of rights as human rights and rights as basic citizen’s rights, where the human rights
portion of the constitutional rights are conceivably applicable to all, and the basic rights only available to
the enjoyment of citizens. This differentiation then would reflect a distinction found within international
human rights law, e.g. with regard to the understanding of democratic rights, and the recognition of
foreigners as subjects under the state’s treaty obligations would also be an issue of customary
international law or even peremptory international law (jus cogens) (Cassese 2005, p. 123), however,
without any clear statement of such application of Chinese constitutional rights with regard to foreign
nationals, this point may be moot.





patients in psychiatric facilities87), the term under Chinese law only describes a very
specific stage of criminal procedure. The details of this will be discussed below. The
distinction between the common use and Chinese understanding of “arrest”
becomes even more clouded as the official Chinese language version of both the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the ICCPR Article 9 in both
cases, use “daibu” in translation of “arrest”, adding to the challenge that China is
facing in ratifying the ICCPR.88
The question is whether or not China chooses to acknowledge the obvious lack of
procedures and institutional design to be “brought promptly before a judge or other
officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power”,89 i.e. an authority which is
independent, objective and impartial in relation to the issues dealt with, for the
purpose of approving the continued deprivation of liberty.90 The other option, to
actively seek a habeas corpus hearing before a court “in order that [it] may decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the
detention is not lawful”,91 is not immediately available under Chinese law.
However, the Criminal Procedure Law does allow challenges to the duration of
ongoing detention,92 and administrative cases against the government have been
heard on the legality of imposed coercive measures, or for compensation following
such detention.93 The reality of such cases being brought to court, however, are
usually considered to be quite slim and difficult to achieve. This will be further
discussed below.
The Chinese mechanisms to control acts of deprivation of liberty are even further
removed from the international standards. The power to decide on the lawfulness of
the arrest is delegated to the People’s Procuratorate. Despite Chinese protestations
to the contrary, the dual role of the Procuratorate to both prosecute crime and
supervise the administration of justice, causes obvious conflicts of interest,
especially with regard to deprivation of liberty. In addition, there are questions of
87 UN Human Rights Committee, "HRC General Comment no.8: Right to liberty and security of persons
(Art. 9)," (1982).para.1; Nowak 2005, p. 219.
88 For a discussion on the linguistic challenges facing Chinese official translations of international treaty
law, and the problem of two official texts of the ICCPR see Sun 2006. It should be noted that the formal
Chinese version of the ICCPR and the later unofficial version; i.e. the one originally translated and
approved by the General Assembly in 1967 when the Republic of China government held the “China
seat” in the UN, and a later Chinese language version that appeared in the early 1970’s, both of which are
found in UN treaty collections, use this term. This may indicate that the original translation from 1967
was believed to convey the intended meaning of the treaty. The term “daibu” (逮捕), along with the term
“juti” (拘提) (a term not used in PRC law meaning “arrest”) in the Taiwan Code on Criminal Procedure
can be understood to be “arrest” in the same sense as described in international law - making the
translations of “arrest” into “daibu” in the UDHR and the ICCPR more understandable (See台湾刑事诉
讼法 (Taiwan Code on Criminal Procedure), 2007), Sect. 1, chapter 8, http://law.moj.gov.tw/Scripts/
newsdetail.asp?no=1C0010001 Accessed 9 January 2008.
89 ICCPR art.9(3).
90 Kulomin v. Hugary, Communication No.521/92 (1996).
91 ICCPR art.9(4).
92 CPL 1996, art.70.
93 林树潮不服海南省劳动教养管理委员会劳动教养决定案 (Lin Shuchao v. Hainan Province Reed-
ucation through labour Management Committee), 1999.
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independence and the ability of the police and judiciary as a whole to withstand
political pressure during more or less perpetual anti-crime and “strike hard”
campaigns, leading to stronger punitive responses from the state against crime and
eventually to a lower threshold for deprivation of liberty and arrest.94 Even if the
Procuratorate could have resolved the conflict of interest between the supervisory
and prosecutorial powers, and although there is a general prohibition against
intervention by administrative organs, public organizations or individuals (xingzh-
eng jiguan 行政机关, shehui tuanti he geren 社会团体和个人) in the work of the
courts and Procuratorate,95 it has been noted that the leadership of the Party over the
judicial organs has been “constantly asserted,”96 leaving the judiciary as a whole
open to direct political intervention through what has been described as a “deliberate
contradiction.”97 While there are arguments from within China that intervention in
court practice by the CCP and the Political-Legal Committees (zhengfa weiyuanhui
政法委员会) on corresponding levels has decreased over the last decade. It has,
however, been suggested in a recent study that this de-politicization of the courts is
quite limited and that there is a renewed emphasis on the “political color” of the
courts and the legal system in general.98
4.1 Decision and approval
The legislation covering “arrest” follows the constitutional provisions quite closely;
only three state organs may initiate and carry out an arrest: the People’s
Procuratorate, the People’s Court and the public security organs (police). An arrest
starts at the point after the approval or decision of the People’s Procuratorate, or
through a decision by the People’s Court at the time of court proceedings.99 The
“approval” by the People’s Procuratorate refers to the basis for an arrest of a suspect
made in the course of the investigative (zhencha 侦察) stage of a criminal case—
most usually after the suspect has already been detained by the Public Security
Bureau. “Decision” refers to an act by the People’s Procuratorate or People’s Court
regarding the need to hold or apprehend a criminal suspect at the time of making
formal charges (li’an 立案) or during the hearing (shenli 审理) of a case.100 The
authority to perform such approvals or decisions may not be delegated to other state
organs.101
94 See e.g. discussions in Trevaskes 2002 and Tanner 2007, p. 174.
95 Constitution 2004, art.126; 中华人民共和国人民法院组织法 (PRC Organic Law of the People’s
Courts), 31 October 2006, art.4; and中华人民共和国人民检察院组织法 (Organic Law of the People’s
Procuratorate), 2 December 1986, art.9.
96 Chen 2008, p. 321.
97 Human Rights Watch 2008, p. 17.
98 Liebman 2007, pp. 627–628.
99 CPL 1996, art. 68, see also Quanguo renda changweihui bangongting yanjiushi zhengzhi zu 1996,
p. 162.
100 Ibid.
101 中华人民共和国人民检察院组织法 (PRC Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorate), 2 September
1983, art.12 and 人民检察院刑事诉讼规则 (People’s Procuratorate Rules on Criminal Procedure,
hereafter SPP-CPL), 18 January 1999, art.92.
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We find, however, that that there are some exceptions or even some added
“thickness” to these approval procedures. Inter alia, delegates of the NPC and
delegates of the People’s Congresses at and above county level, cannot be arrested
(daibu) without the consent of the Presidium (zhuxituan 主席团) of the relevant
People’s Congress (PC), or when the PC is not in session the consent of the Standing
Committee of the PC is required. Furthermore, if a delegate is detained because of a
crime, the public security organ has to report it to the PC organs immediately.102
With regard to the arrest, criminal verdict, or other deprivation of liberty of village
or township level PC delegates, the public security organ shall report it to the same
level PC; however, prior notification or permission from the People’s Congress will
not be required.103 This is, however, provided that the delegate is not a CCP
member and therefore subject to the CPP’s internal disciplinary hearings and extra-
legal detention—or shuanggui (双规), which will be discussed further below.
In the case of “Jiao Chunsheng and others unlawfully detaining a People’s
Congress deputy”104 the prosecution argued for unlawful deprivation of liberty due
to lacking notification to the local PC based on reading Article 35 of the Organic
Law of the Local People’s Congress and Local People’s Governments of the PRC
together with CL Article 143 (CL Article 238 after the 1997 amendment), claiming
that the acts concerned had “severely violated” (yanzhong qinfan 严重侵犯) the
legal rights of the victim. The defense claimed that the 8-days deprivation of liberty
was lawful as it was instituted during a formal “detention and investigation”
(shourong shencha收容审查)105 procedure. Changchun People’s Court agreed with
the prosecution’s submissions, but chose to render a verdict based solely on the
Criminal Law not making use of the specific legislation covering NPC delegates.
Another exception to the general arrest procedures is found in CPL Article 63,
allowing “citizens arrest”. When encountering a person committing a crime or upon
discovering a person immediately at the scene of the crime, a person who is wanted
for arrest, or a person who has escaped from prison or is being pursued for arrest
etc., anyone (renhe ren 任何人) has the right to immediately seize and deliver a
criminal suspect to the police (PSB), People’s Procuratorate, or People’s Court.106
Quite unsurprisingly, this does not mean that one has the right to act as a
substitute for the police. This principle has been explicitly formulated in a first
102 中华人民共和国全国人民代表大会组织法 (PRC Organic Law of the National People’s Congress),
10 December 1982, art.44;中华人民共和国地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法(2004
修正) (PRC Organic Law of the Local People’s Congress and Local People’s Governments at various
levels (2004 Revision)), 27 October 2004, art.35; see also中华人民共和国全国人民代表大会和地方各
级人民代表大会代表法 (PRC Law on Deputies to the National People’s Congress and to the Local
People’s Congresses at Various Levels, hereafter Law on Deputies), 3 April 1992, art.30, paras. 1 and 2.
103 Law on Deputies 1992, art.30, paras. 1 and 2.
104 焦春生等人非法拘禁人大代表案 (Jiao Chunsheng et al. case), 5 March 1993, 长春市中级人民法
院 (Changchun City Intermediate People’s Court).
105 Shourong shencha (收容审查), or shoushen (收审), was a measure for the police to hold suspects
indefinitely for investigative purposes. The measure was abolished along with the 1996 Criminal
Procedure Law amendment, at least nominally, see Wong 1996.
106 CPL 1996, art.63. This provision follows the exact wording found in the 1979 “Regulations of the
People’s Republic of China on Arrest and Detention” (Daibu juliu tiaoli 逮捕拘留条例), which was
superseded by the 1996 revision of the CPL.
The right to liberty of person 51
123
instance decision under a Sichuan municipal court decision where a person acting as
a policeman unlawfully detained and questioned a person suspected of committing a
crime. The court said that such conduct was “…to use unlawful (feifa 非法)
methods of investigation, to unlawfully deprive someone of their liberty in a
confined room (liuzhishi 留置室), this act constitutes the crime of unlawful
incarceration (feifa jujin zui非法拘禁罪).” The first instance decision was upheld in
the second instance.107 This ruling would perhaps be exotic were it not for the
recently reported problems of “false police officers” and volunteer vigilante
groups,108 or the issue of the PSB owned private security companies (bao’an fuwu
gongsi保安服务公司), the employment of auxiliary police (xiejing协警) and their
role in maintaining public order, among many other things.109
In addition to arrest, measures for deprivation of liberty in criminal justice
proceedings include forced summons (juchuan 拘传) and criminal detention
(xingshi juliu刑事拘留), including criminal judicial detention (xingshi sifa juliu刑
事司法拘留).110 Measures that may substitute arrest by merely restricting a
citizen’s personal freedom include bail (qubao houshen 取保候审) and residential
surveillance (jianshi juzhu 监视居住, a form of “house arrest”).111 The latter is a
form of “soft detention” (ruanjin 软禁) that often is thought to transgress on the
limits of legality. As the public security organs may impose such soft detention at
will the potential level of arbitrariness of this sanction is similar to the unlawful
government practices further discussed below.
The nature of these measures is for the “prevention” of violations of public,
social or personal interests; moreover it may be invoked to prevent escape, false
testimony, or other concerns prior or during criminal proceedings. In the CPL the
following situations are listed as legitimate grounds for criminal detention by the
public security organ (police), if the suspect is “(1) …preparing to commit a crime,
is in the process of committing a crime or is discovered immediately after
committing a crime; (2) if he is identified as having committed a crime by a victim
or an eyewitness; (3) if criminal evidence is found on his body or at his residence;
(4) if he attempts to commit suicide or escape after committing a crime, or he is a
fugitive; (5) if there is likelihood of his destroying or falsifying evidence or tallying
confessions; (6) if he does not tell his true name and address and his identity is
unknown; and (7) if he is strongly suspected of committing crimes from one place to
another, repeatedly, or in a gang.”112 The People’s Procuratorate may also order
criminal detention of suspects in cases handled directly by the Procuratorate,113 this
107 吴心苏非法拘禁案 (Wu Xinsu case), 13 October 2000, 四川省广元市中级人民法院 (Guangyuan
City Intermediate People’s Court, Sichuan Province).
108 Former Military Doctor Shot Dead in Row Over ID, South China Morning Post, 14 November 2007;
Vigilante Escapes Charges Over Death of Suspected Thief, South China Morning Post, 21 November
2007.
109 In Harm’s Way, South China Morning Post, 12 October 2007; see also Dutton 2005.
110 Long and Yang 2003, pp. 274–293.
111 CPL 1996, art.51.




usually involves cases where state officials are suspected of corruption and abuse of
powers.114
When executing these coercive measures, and as proof of the legality of the use of
the coercive measure, the public security organs, who may also be assisted by the
judicial police—sifa jingcha (司法警察) of the People’s Procuratorate and People’s
Court, must present a detention permission or proof of decision, either as a “summons
warrant” (juchuan zheng 拘传证), “detention warrant” (juliu zheng 拘留证), or
“arrest warrant” (daibu zheng逮捕证).115 The use of criminal detention is limited to
the investigation (zhencha 侦察) period in the criminal procedure, and it is further
only to be applied by the public security organ and the Procuratorate. These permits or
decisions, except for criminal judicial detention (xingshi sifa juliu刑事司法拘留), do
not involve the court.116 Criminal judicial detention, however, differs in that it is
imposed by the courts in response to threats to the order of the court, and its procedural
guarantees are similar to the procedure under civil judicial detention (minshi sifa juliu
民事司法拘留) that will be discussed below. CPL does not open for supervision of
criminal detention by the people’s court, with the obvious exception of criminal
judicial detention, as it only stipulates internal supervisory procedures of permissions
or decisions. The legality of any of the criminal detention measures, including arrest,
is to be guaranteed only through procedures requiring the police or the Procuratorate
to interrogate the suspect within 24 h of detention to determine the facts of the case,
and potentially ensuring the release of the suspect if a case cannot be established (li’an
立案).117 In case the police find reason for continued detention it may apply the
Procuratorate for arrest approval. However, what should be noted is that while the
Procuratorate evaluates the application for arrest, the organ is only looking at whether
or not there is sufficient evidence for establishing a case; to the necessity of the arrest
is something that the Procuratorate “normally does absolutely not take into
consideration” (yiban bing bu kaolü一般并不考虑).118 In protecting the liberty of
person, these procedural rules are only relying on rather ineffective internal
supervisory mechanisms between the police and the Procuratorate, and it has been
pointed out that “[i]n practice … unlawful detention or arrest … [is] hard to discover
by people outside the executing organs.”119
4.2 Time limits
The Criminal Procedure Law also stipulates that within 24 h, public security organ
should inform the family members or unit (danwei单位) to which he or she belongs
114 Wang 2005a, p. 358.
115 公安机关办理刑事案件程序规定 (Rules of Procedures for Public Security Organs Handling
Criminal Cases, hereafter MPS Rules), 14 May 1998, arts. 61, 106, 123;人民检察院司法警察执行职务
规则 (Rules on Executive Functions of the People’s Procuratorate Judicial Police) (experimental),
18 June 2001, arts. 12 and 13, para. 2.
116 Long and Yang 2003, p. 284.
117 CPL 1996, arts.65 and 72.
118 Wang 2005a, b, c, p. 147.
119 Yue 2005, p. 82.
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on the reasons of detention and place of custody—except under circumstances when
such notification would hinder the investigation or there is no way of notifying
them.120 However, this rule does not lead to effective public monitoring, as there are
no mechanisms for ensuring that the police actually report deprivations of liberty,
and the possibility for abuse of power still exists. Several widely publicized cases
point to this lack of supervision with police detention, where persons have been held
by the police for long periods of time, sometimes without formal charge or arrest,
and in some extreme cases up to 3, 14 or even 28 years,121 but in another case a
period of only 24 h of detention during interrogation was sufficient to be labeled
“extended detention” (chaoqi jiya 超期羁押) by the court.122
Formally, article 69 of the CPL stipulates that the police must apply for arrest
approval within 3 days but that in particularly complex cases this time limit may be
extended to 30 days. As the Procuratorate has 7 days to approve the application for
formal arrest, the extreme lawful length in police custody may reach 37 days.
Human Rights Watch has found that the public security organs applied this period to
“all pre-arrest detention indiscriminately.”123 As for arrest, there are no specific
stipulations on time limits outside the investigative (zhencha 侦查) stage.124 This
period may reach three and a half months.125 In handling “extended custody” cases
only the investigative stage of a criminal proceeding will be investigated, and up to
the end of 2003, the People’s Courts cleared 4.100 cases of extended custody,
involving 7.658 persons.126 It has been found, however, that despite initiatives to
reduce instances of extended custody, the absolute numbers do not seem to have any
significant reductions.127 A chapter in the same study also found a significant
relationship between the early access to lawyer and abuse of powers, in particular at
the time of first detention by the police and including extended detention.128 Under
the present CPL access to a lawyer is not granted at this stage, however, this is not
an issue within Article 37 as any inferred reference to legal representation is only
buried in Article 125, chapter 4, of the Constitution. Along with the requirement that
trials should be held in public (cf. ICCPR Article 14), and only then under the
120 CPL 1996, art.64 and 71.
121 The latter case,谢某国家赔偿案 (Xie Hongwu State Compensation Case) (2003), led to much debate
in China and in a commentary published on the People’s Daily web-site the case was pointed out as one of
the most important cases in China’s rule of law development. The plaintiff, Xie Hongwu was detained in
1974 charged with keeping reactionary leaflets supposedly dropped by airplane over his small village and
only released in 2002 with a declaration of innocence, http://legal.people.com.cn/GB/42735/5014063.html
Accessed 13 August 2010. See the cases noted in Wang 2005a, b, c, p. 147; see also Human Rights Watch
2001, pp. 48–49.
122 上官建伟不服河南省渑池县公安局治安管理处罚裁决案 (Shangguan Jianwei v. Mianchi County
PSB), 27 January 1997, 河南省渑池县人民法院 (Mianchi County People’s Court, Henan Province).
123 Human Rights Watch 2001, p. 48.
124 Shen 2005, p. 68.
125 Yue 2005, p. 84.
126 Statistic published in Shen 2005, p. 67.
127 Chen 2005, p. 92.
128 Fan 2005, pp. 368–369.
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formulation that “the accused has the right to defense,” there are no specific
entitlements to actual legal representation by a lawyer in the constitution.
However, CPL does provide recourse measures for challenging extended
custody. Article 75 stipulates: “If the compulsory measures adopted by a People’s
Court, a People’s Procuratorate or a public security organ exceed the time limit
prescribed by law, the criminal suspect or defendant, his legal representatives, near
relatives, or the lawyers or other defenders entrusted by the criminal suspect or
defendant shall have the right to demand cancellation of the compulsory measures.”
However, the specific rules for making use of this procedure are absent from the
CPL, and their operation relies solely on personal resources, ability and knowledge.
Furthermore, that there are no clear stipulations on either internal or external
monitoring, creating effective guarantees that a person will not be subjected to
extended custody, may be one of the important factors to explain why custody
beyond the time limits stipulated by the law is very frequently seen.129
4.3 Legality
The final paragraph of Article 37 involves the question of deprivation of liberty in a
broader sense, not only referring to deprivation of liberty as following criminal
proceedings, but also in administrative and civil proceedings, as well as on the
“horizontal” level. In the following, these terms will be discussed further, but first at
a note on legality.
The principle of legality of the right to liberty of person is clearly, although
negatively, formulated in Article 37 through the general prohibition of unlawful
(feifa) deprivation of liberty. The principle of legality has been described by a
NPCSC working group led by the late Prof. Cai Dingjian (蔡定剑) as carrying two
separate aspects of legality, namely that the acts are either “illegal” (weifa违法) or
“unlawful” (feifa 非法).130 “Illegal” refers to any act of deprivation of citizen’s
liberty by any person which is not competent to do so by law.131 “Unlawful” on the
other hand, refers to unlawful acts when anyone, including government represen-
tatives, public security organs, the Procuratorate or Courts make use of extra legal
means, or powers, to deprive a person of her freedom ultra vires.132 Although one
could wish that these terms were consistently used, we do find that persons
committing acts that could be considered illegal, are punished for unlawful acts—
and vice versa, as we will see below. However, for the purpose of this discussion the
distinction plays an important role. While private citizens are usually not permitted
to deprive anyone of their liberty through specific prohibitions, state organs will
129 Chen 2005, p. 91.
130 Quanguo renda changweihui bangongting yanjiushi zhengzhi zu, ed., 1996, p. 162.
131 See commentary in 李金胜诉偃师市公安局非法限制其人身自由案 (Li Jinsheng v. Yanshi city
PSB), 26 May 1997, 河南省偃师市人民法院 (Yanshi City People’s Court, Henan Province).
(Legislative Office of the State Council PR China) http://law.npc.gov.cn/Accessed 8 February 2005.
Case on file with author.
132 Quanguo renda changweihui bangongting yanjiushi zhengzhi zu, ed., 1996, p. 162.
The right to liberty of person 55
123
need to find specific legislation that allow deprivations of liberty, which makes the
question of lawfulness the core of the principle of legality.133
The principle of legality is the basic ground for preventing arbitrariness in
deprivation of liberty, but if lacking the general constraints of proportionality and
necessity of the adopted means, the law itself, or the understanding thereof, may be
flawed by ideology or instrumentalist application of law. Consequently, rather than
creating guarantees against arbitrariness, the unqualified requirement of legality
actually lends a hand in the creation of legal formalism, and we remain unable to
decide whether a certain coercive measure stipulated by the law is reasonable or
proportionate. As China has not established an effective system for constitutional
review, examining the constitutionality of coercive measures remains largely an
academic exercise.134
One of the most problematic areas with regard to legality of deprivation of liberty
in China is found within the police’s powers to employ administrative coercive
measures.135 These coercive measures include, inter alia, administrative detention
(xingzheng juliu 行政拘留), isolation for compulsory drug treatment (qiangzhi geli
jiedu强制隔离戒毒, ICDT), replacing forced drug rehabilitation (qiangzhi jiedu强
制戒毒),136 detention for education (shourong jiaoyu 收容教育, DE), reeducation
through labour (laodong jiaoyang 劳动教养 or laojiao 劳教, RETL). Furthermore,
133 Mo 2004, pp. 113–114. Original emphasis, my translation. A Chinese scholar has made a distinction
in constitutional theory between the “surplus power principle” (shengyu quanli yuanze, 剩余权力原则)
and “surplus rights principle” (shengyu quanli yuanze, 剩余权利原则). The former is a formulation of
ultra vires referring to “the negation of the legitimacy of state power existing outside [the scope of] the
constitution, meaning that with regard to the actions of state organs in charge of public services, any act
not stipulated by the constitution is prohibited”—or any other law for that matter. The latter term
“acknowledges the legitimacy of freedom outside [the scope of] the constitution, namely: to citizens,
anything not forbidden by the constitution is permitted.” This argument was made by Mo Jihong while
discussing the limitations on state power and individual liberties, which in many ways is the other side of
the coin in relation to the questions regarding legality (as in illegal or unlawful).
134 Tong 2004, reproduced in 人大复印资料, 宪法与行政法 (RUC Reprints, Constitutional and
Administrative Procedure Law), no. 1, 2005, p. 28. In an introduction to the Chinese system for
examining violations of the constitution, Mr. Li Fei, erstwhile assistant director of the NPC Standing
Committee (NPCSC) Legislative Affairs Commission, referred to the review procedure under art. 90(2)
of the Legislation Law, stating that “any citizen can request the National People’s Congress and its
Standing Committee to examine violations against the constitution” (进行违宪审查的要求). Further-
more, that “regarding doubtful laws, the legislative organ (立法工作机关) of the National People’
Congress should first make its examinations (审查), and if [the doubtful law] is confirmed unlawful or
unconstitutional, the relevant provision may be abolished, or the organ who formulated the stipulation
may be requested to correct it”. The article did not discuss the effectiveness of this system. Others
however, have demonstrated that despite numerous applications for review under this system of
constitutional review, and there being some positive aspects in this system being the only “acceptable
forum for constitutional challenges,” these appeals are yet to receive an official response, and at least in
the short term these arguments seem “limited or even non-existent” (Hand 2007 cites at least 37 requests
since the system was established under art. 90(2) of the Legislation Law in 2000; see also Hand 2009).
135 For a more complete discussion on administrative measures see Biddulph 2007.
136 全国人大常委会关于禁毒的决定 (The National People’s Congress Standing Committee decision on
strict prohibition of drugs), 28 December 1990, was replaced by the new law中华人民共和国禁止毒品法
(PRC Law on the strict prohibition of drugs) that came into effect on 1 June 2008. For a discussion on the
development and reform of the forced drug treatment regime in China see Sapio 2008a.
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the criminal sanction “detention for reeducation” (shourong jiaoyang收容教养)137
applicable to juveniles from 14 years but not yet 16 year of age, has been
institutionalized within RETL camps since 1996.138 Placing this criminal sanction
within an administrative system may be indicative of the reformative objectives of
this particular sanction, however, little is known about its scope and operation.
Different from the coercive measures under criminal procedure, most of the
administrative coercive measures are not “preventive”, but rather either penal or
reformatory. The scope of normative sources for these measures include legislation
on administrative detention such as the Administrative Punishment Law (APL),139
and State Council or NPCSC decisions, e.g. the State Council’s “Decision on
reeducation through labour”140 and the detention for education (shourong jiaoyu收
容教育) system established by the NPCSC’s “Decision on the strict prohibition of
prostitution”.141 Other administrative measures for deprivation or restriction of
liberty of person include, coercive hospitalization (qiangzhi zhiliao强制治疗), and
coercive isolation (qiangzhi geli强制隔离). These latter measures, however, are not
by nature penal, but should be understood as preventive coercive measures.
Although most of these coercive measures have a certain “reformative character-
istic” in common, as their objective is to inter alia educate people engaged in
prostitution, and help addicts to stop using drugs,142 the adopted means arguably
holds a certain punitive nature, in particular as these measures are often connected
to RETL.
According to the article 9 of the APL, administrative penalties that make use of
deprivation of liberty of person can only be formulated by law. This stipulation
reflects the Legislation Law that expressly prescribes that any deprivation of liberty
must exist in “law” (falü法律, LL Article 8(5)), and that this law must be a “basic
law” (jiben falü 基本法律) passed by the NPC itself (Article 9) and not by its
standing committee. However, RETL and DE are not established by law, as
required. The document establishing RETL clearly lacks the legal position required
by the LL. Therefore, in order to correct this issue of legality an “illegal acts
corrections law” (weifa xingwei jiaozhi fa违法行为矫治法) has been proposed, and
it was placed on the legislative calendar for 2005 of the National Standing
137 CL 1997, art.17(4).
138 司法部关于将政府收容教养的犯罪少年移至劳动教养场所收容教养的通知 (PRC Ministry of
Justice notice on moving juveniles under government detention for reeducation to reeducation through
labour camps for reeducation), 22 January 1996.
139 中华人民共和国行政处罚法 (Administrative Punishment Law, hereafter APL), 17 March 1996,
art.8, para. 6.
140 国务院关于劳动教养问题的决定 (PRC State Council Decision on Reeducation through labour), 1
August 1957.
141 全国人大常委会关于严禁卖淫嫖娼的决定 (NPC Standing Committee decision on the Strict
Prohibition of Prostitution), 4 September 1991.
142 See e.g. 国务院卖淫嫖娼人员收容教育办法 (PRC State Council Measures on Detention for
Education of Prostitutes), 4 September 1993, art.1.
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Committee.143 However, the law is yet to surface and the legality of these
administrative measures remains disputed.
Indeed, the lawfulness of RETL has arisen in a case in 2007. “Chen Chao sues
the RETL committee” became a landmark “case” in 2007 144 for claiming that the
RETL system as a whole was unlawful and that the decision to intern the plaintiff
for 2 years consequently lacked legal basis (meiyou falü yiju 没有法律依据). The
court never heard the case as the RETL decision was cancelled and a formal arrest
approval was given just as the case was to come up in the local court.145 Available
sources do not clarify the relationship between the two acts, however, one could
suspect that there would be a rather close relationship between the suddenly aborted
suit and the generally problematic legality of the RETL system. This case
demonstrates some of the flexibility that is allowed within the Chinese legal system
as to the legality of coercive measures involving deprivation of liberty. Similarly
there are questions that may be put forth with regard to other administrative
measures that are either subject to weak normative control or even completely lack
governing laws, more on this below.
Another aspect of the flexibility of administrative measures that was touched
upon in the “Chen Chao陈超” case was the use of RETL as a substitute for formal
arrest. The local Procuratorate did not approve the arrest application from the police
due to lack of evidence and ordered that the suspect be released from custody
immediately. However, rather than following this order, the police held Chen Chao
for another 5 days until a decision was obtained sentencing him to Reeducation
through labour for 2 years. This instrumental use of RETL illustrates how the criminal
justice system may be used along with administrative penal measures to increase the
authority of the police. At the same time this leaves some chilling conclusions as to the
continued instrumental nature of coercive measures and legality in relation to the
administration of justice and the limits on the right to liberty of person.
5 Detention and restriction of personal liberty
The third paragraph of Article 37 elaborates on the scope of the provision in relation
to the nature of the deprivation of liberty concerned. In addition to arrest, the
provision includes unlawful detention/custody (jujin 拘禁), “deprivation or restric-
tion of citizens’ freedom by other means”, and unlawful search (soucha搜查). Jujin
is probably better translated as “custody”, however, following the usual translation of
Article 37 the term “detention” will be used. A distinction will be made in the text as
to the Chinese term in question.
143 廖卫华 (Liao W) 违法行为矫治拟替代劳教制度 (Correction Illegal Acts Drafted as Alternative to
RETL System), 新京报 (Xin Jing Bao), 2 March 2005, A07, http://www.chinalawinfo.
com/fzdt/NewsContent.aspx?id=13663. Accessed 12 April 2011.
144 2007年度十大影响性诉讼 (The Ten Biggest Law Suits in 2007)南方周末 (Southern Weekend), 10
January 2008, http://www.infzm.com/content/6007. Accessed 12 April 2011.
145 吴勇 (Wu Y) (Ed)劳动教养制度的存废之争 (Existence and Abolition of the RETL System) Dahe.
cn, 6 December 2007, http://www.dahe.cn/XWZX/rdtj/t20071206_1219106.htm. Accessed 18 June 2008;
Sommeregger 2006 and Golub and Lingley 2008.
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“Detention” (jujin 拘禁) refers to deprivation of personal freedom by means of
detention (juliu 拘留) as discussed above, confinement (jinbi 禁闭) or other
coercive measures, which have been suggested to include, inter alia, trussing
up (kunbang 捆绑) and investigation in isolation (geli shencha 隔离审查).146
This shallow definition, however, must be seen as only a hint of all the possible
ways deprivation of liberty may occur. Other means for deprivation or restriction of
freedom includes any other act of restriction of liberty of person, for example
unlawful restraints, trafficking and forced prostitution.147 Extra-legal state practices
such as local governments establishing so-called “small black rooms” (xiao hei wu
小黑屋), study classes (xuexiban 学习班), “gray jails” (huilao 灰牢), or the far
more profiled “black jails” (hei jianyu 黑监狱),148 places further challenges to the
actual enjoyment of the stipulated rights under Article 37. These measures, as
punitive, retributive or reformative sanctions in order to handle perceived
transgressions of policies or administrative rules such as violations of family
planning rules,149 or as an unlawful government response to petitioning (xinfang
信访) etc., constitute de facto deprivation of liberty by being locked up in a room
for “studies” from a few days to a couple of weeks.150 All of these measures
completely lack legal foundation. Despite a verdict—already in 1992—clearly
deeming such measures as “illegal administrative acts” (weifa xingzheng xingwei
违法行政行为),151 local governments continue to employ extra-legal disciplinary
measures, further weakening the value of the existing legal guarantees against
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
The Party-level parallel to the huilao is the highly opaque shuanggui system that
allows for the use of detention by the CCP Commissions for Discipline Inspection to
investigate Party members for violations of discipline violations, including
corruption. Although far more regulated than the ad hoc measures employed by
local governments, shuanggui is still problematic in constitutional terms, especially
as the internal Party rules on the system clearly are challenged by the legality
requirement discussed above.152
On the horizontal level CL Article 238 (previously CL Article 143 prior to the
1997 revision) is the chief and defining stipulation on protection of the right to
personal freedom. This article reflects the “horizontal” norm aspects of Article 37,
146 Quanguo renda changweihui bangongting yanjiushi zhengzhi zu 1996, p. 162.
147 Ibid.
148 Human Rights Watch 2009;“学习班”为何叫“小黑屋” (Why “Studygroups” are Called “Small
Dark Rooms”)广西新闻网-南国早报 (Guangxi XinwenWang—Nanguo Zaobao), 2 April 2007;拆迁学
习班是代表性的违法事件 (Classes on Forced Demolition Classic Case of Illegal Activity)北京青年报
(Beijing Youth Daily), 4 April 2007 http://www.ynet.com/view.jsp?oid=19829584 Accessed 28 May
2007.
149 See commentary cited above in Li Jinsheng v. Yanshi city PSB, 26 May 1997, Yanshi City People’s
Court, Henan Province.
150 For an account of the development and use of these “gray jails”, see Wu 2007, p. 57.
151 闵绍清等四人诉四川省大邑县元兴乡人民政府强行扣押其财产和限制人身自由行政侵权案 (Min
Shaoqing et al. v. Sichuan Dayi county People’s Government), 20 March 1992, 四川省大邑县人民法
院 (Dayi County People’s Court, Sichuan Province).
152 For a systematic look into the shuanggui system see Sapio 2008b.
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para. 3, as it prohibits any person to “unlawfully detain another person or unlawfully
[deprive] the personal freedom of another person by any other means”.153 There
have been a number of cases that handle deprivation of liberty and violations under
this rule that also paint a broader picture of what “unlawful detention” may entail:
forcing a person to remain in a room154; detaining a person in a building or a room
such as a corridor,155 meeting room,156 or toilet157; locking or sealing in a person in
a room158; only using threat of violence to hold a hostage (does not involve
confining a person to a specific room)159; as well as holding a person as hostage as
leverage for enforcement of debt (as stipulated Article 283(3)).160 These cases
illustrate that the application of Article 238 not only concern direct restriction of
liberty in a ordinary sense, i.e. locking someone up, but also not allowing someone
to leave a locality or using threats to restrict the liberty of person are also within the
scope of the law, underscoring the suggested definitions above.
Other acts of unlawful restriction of personal freedom, are elsewhere covered by
the criminal law, for example trafficking in women and children,161 buying
trafficked women and children and unlawful deprivation and restriction of their
personal freedom,162 forcing another to work by restricting his or her personal
freedom,163 maltreatment of family members,164 kidnapping for the purpose of
extortion.165 As for a differentiation between the latter provision and the above
153 CL 1997, art.238, para.1.
154 冯玉霞非法拘禁他人强迫他人作伪证包庇罪犯案 (Feng Yuxia case), 8 August 1994 河南省邓州
市人民法院 (Dengzhou County People’s Court, Henan Province).
155 禹作敏等八人非法管制、非法拘禁、窝藏、妨害公务、行贿案 (Branch of the People’s Procura-
torate of Tianjin Municipality v. Yu Zuomin, et al.), 27 August 1993, 天津市中级人民法院 (Tianjin
Intermediate People’s Court).
156 陆国平、王国富故意伤害案;汪金成非法拘禁案 (Lu Guoping et al. case), 16 August 2000,上海市
虹口区人民法院 (Hongkou District People’s Court, Shanghai).
157 张韬故意杀人、非法拘禁,奚大震非法拘禁、包庇,胡宇非法拘禁,姜广毅包庇上诉案 (Zhang
Tao et al. appeals case), 14 December 2000, 北京市高级人民法院 (Beijing High People’s Court).
158 马长岭、李京波在索债过程中非法拘禁他人案 (Ma Changlin et al. case), 27 September 1994,
山西省阳泉市中级人民法院 (Yangquan City Intermediate People’s Court, Shanxi Province).
159 陈学全非法拘禁案 (Chen Xuequan case), 28 November 1996, 福建省长泰县人民法院 (Changtai
County People’s Courty of Fujian Province); See also the 2000 SPC interpretation on the application of
this provision under art.238(3) in 最高人民法院关于对为索取法律不予保护的债务,非法拘禁他人行
为如何定罪问题的解释 (Supreme People’s Court interpretation of the question of how to sentence acts
of unlawful detention in order to recover debts not protected by the law), 13 July 2000, in 1985–2005
年司法解释 (Interpretations of Civil Law from 1985 to 2005) 2005, p. 157.
160 白国栓、于彦蛟劫持人质索要欠款致人死亡案 (Bai Guoshan et al. case), 23 July 1995,湖北省孝
感市中级人民法院 Xiaogan City Intermediate People’s Court, Hubei Province); 胡爱斌挟持他人作人
质非法拘禁案 (Hu Aibin et al. case), 17 March 1998, 湖南省邵阳市北塔区人民法院 (Beita District
People’s Court, Shaoyang City, Hunan Province); 吴少军、赵青非法拘禁上诉案 (Wu Shaojun et al.
appeals case), 21 November 2000,内蒙古自治区高级人民法院 (High People’s Court of the Automous
Region of Inner Mongolia).
161 CL 1997, art.240.






hostage situation, Zhendong Municipal People’s Court, Haikou, made the following
statement in the verdict of the “Huang Yongzhu case” (黄永柱案):
Ordinary citizens may constitute the subjects of the crime in both [types of]
crimes. The object of violation in both cases includes the right to liberty of
person. The objective aspects (keguan fangmian 客观方面) of the crimes are
manifested by using coercive means in order to depriving another person of
the right to personal freedom (renshen ziyou quan 人身自由权), and the
subjective aspect of the crimes is that their purpose is to obtain material assets
(caiwu 财物).
In making a statement on the motivations for unlawful deprivation of liberty as basis
for difference in nature of criminal acts the verdict continues:
The difference between the two crimes is: The objective in the crime of
kidnapping is to obtain other people’s material assets (caiwu 财物), often the
possessions of the injured party or his/her family members. Before committing
the crime the criminal generally does not have a material assets (caiwu财物)
exchange relations with the injured party or members of his/her family. The
debt sought repaid in crimes of unlawful detention (feifa jujin zui suoqu de
zhaiwu 非法拘禁罪所取得债务), on the other hand, is a debt owed by the
injured party and his or her family members to the perpetrator; before the
crime is committed, a creditor-debtor relationship (zhaiquan zhaiwu guanxi
债权债务关系) exists between the criminal and the injured party or his/her
family.166
However, the prohibition against deprivation of liberty between citizens is not
absolute, exceptions include acts of restrictions on personal freedom of minors made
by parents, guardians or supervisors in order to educate or discipline them.
Prevention or intervention against children at risk of being lured into criminal acts
by, for example forbidding him or her to leave house or room (bedroom or other
room), is also considered legitimate.167 Of course, disciplining minors does have to
be proportionate, and crossing a certain degree of restriction to personal freedom,
may constitute a violation, and in serious cases amount to crime of abuse, and
should bear criminal responsibility.168
Finally, the question of the term “search” as found in Article 37 and its further
normative scope as found in CL Article 245 (Article 144 in the 1979 Criminal Law).
The scope of “search” is said to include the body, clothes on the body and objects
that are carried at the time of the search.169 However, the literature on the issue is
166 黄永柱非法拘禁案 (The Case of Huang Yongzhu’s Unlawful Detainment), 18 September 2000,
海口市振东区人民法院 (Zhendong District People’s Court, Haikou City).
167 Li and Zu 2002, p. 433 and Chen and Wu 2003.
168 Chen and Wu 2003.
169 See commentary in 倪培璐、王颖诉中国国际贸易中心侵害名誉权纠纷案 (Ni Peilu and Wang
Ying v. China World Trade Center), 18 November 1992, 北京市朝阳区人民法院 (Chaoyang District
People’s Court, Beijing). The case concerns the unlawful search of two customers at a supermarket within
the World Trade Center in Beijing, although the court never got to render a verdict in this case (it was
settled out of court) and the original charges only refers to the right to honor (mingyu名誉), making no
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not abundant and the limitations concerning this provision are not clear. The police
are authorized to perform searches.170 What is unclear is whether other law
enforcement agencies, especially the city administration organ (chengshi guanli
xingzheng zhifa 城市管理行政执法 or “chengguan 城管”), may perform searches
of personal property. Furthermore, it is unclear as to whether a citizen’s car or his or
her other movable things belong in the scope of “search of citizen’s body”;
however, if a citizen’s vehicle is at the same time at his or her residence, the act of
unlawful search would instead fall within the scope of Article 39 and the right to
inviolability of the home.171 Although basic literature on criminal law does include
residence (zhuzhai 住宅) within the scope of Article 245, it might be reasonable to
make the distinction between the physical person and residence for the sake of a
rights discussion.172
6 Conclusion
Despite the cases that exist and the rather large amount of literature on
constitutional theory in China, constitutional rights remain elusive and abstract.
The lack of a binding interpretation of constitutional statutes grants the government
fairly extensive elasticity in the understanding of rights. This again fits well with
rights having to be adapted to the historical circumstances of the state, making
constitutional statements programmatic in the sense that they are perhaps not
intended to hold an acceptably broad scope or even to see immediate effect at all.
Furthermore, as has been discussed above, the question of access to redress is also
dependent on the State recognition, further weakening any rights arguments. Thus,
the lack of an interpretation, making any explicit and binding statements to the effect
of the related provisions, leaves any claim regarding the validity of these provisions
open to doubt, even on a theoretical level, and the only test for the content and scope
of rights would then have to be found within the application of lower level legislation
with the sometime help of references to constitutional provisions.
This conclusion points towards an inherent arbitrariness in both how constitu-
tional rights are theoretically construed and how these rights are put into practice.
The arbitrariness of this delineation of content and scope has been demonstrated
through the above discussion on deprivation of liberty, however, it would be
expected that a similar argument of arbitrariness could be made for the other forty-
odd rights statements within the Chinese constitution.
Footnote 169 continued
reference to liberty of person, the case has received a lot of attention on the basis of the unlawful body
search by a security guard. The commentary correctly makes the link to the illegal search made of the
plaintiff’s handbags, see also Han 2005, p. 21 on the corresponding provision in the Consumer Protection
Law (中华人民共和国消费者权益保护法 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Protection of
Consumer Rights and Interests), 1 January 1994, art.25, prohibiting body searches as well as limitations
on the consumers physical freedom (liberty of person).
170 中华人民共和国人民警察法 (PRC Police Law), 28 February 1995, art.12.
171 Xie 1999, p. 180.
172 See Gao and Ma 2005, p. 535 and Qu 2005, p. 277.
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More specifically, the above discussion has covered some aspects of the right to
liberty as provided for under Chinese law, where legal substance and procedure in
general prescribe the following four guarantees:
1. Detention, arrest, administrative detention or other means of depriving
individuals of their liberty requires a formal authorization or decision,173
except in times of emergency174;
2. The measures used for deprivation of liberty shall have a clear time limit, and
where this time limit has been exceeded the detained or incarcerated shall have
means of redress175;
3. Compulsory measures should provide remedial mechanisms, providing
detained and incarcerated with the ability to seek redress, and to guarantee
the timely release of the detained176;
4. Anyone found illegally detained shall have a general right to compensation.177
This formalist description reveals the apparent lack of judicial control with
deprivation of liberty. This lack of control with the state’s authority and power to
deprive its citizens of their liberty is a central weakness in the right as formulated in
Article 37 of the constitution, and a demonstration of the general weakness of
procedural rights within the Chinese legal system. This conclusion can also be
extended to the other rights within the Chinese constitution. The lack of effective
control with state powers combined with poor complaints mechanisms described
above illustrates dramatically how constitutional rights in general are weak and
subject to political constraints.
Furthermore, a more substantive analysis reveals that there is a lack of an
efficient supervisory system for monitoring public security organs and People’s
Procuratorate, allowing abuse of power to happen without the possibility of
independent review. Consequently we find that the existing procedural guarantees
for ensuring lawful deprivation of liberty remains weak—and by some accounts
fundamentally lacking.178 Apart from the lawful actions of the police and the
judiciary, other acts and measures violating the liberty of person pose further
challenges for the protection of individual. These challenges not only include
unlawful acts by other individual citizens, e.g. trafficking and sale of persons,
173 See CPL 1996, arts. 59 and 71; SPP-CPL 1999, arts. 32, 77, 91; CivPL 1991, art.105; APL 1996,
art.39; 中华人民共和国治安管理处罚法 (Law of the People’s Republic of China on Public Security
Administrative Punishments, hereafter SAPL), 28 August 2005, art.101;国务院关于转发公安部制定的
劳动教养试行办法的通知 (State Council Guidelines on the Implementation of Reeducation through
labour, hereafter RETL Guidelines), 21 January 1982, art.12.
174 See CPL 1996, art.61.
175 See CPL 1996, arts. 58, 65, 69, 71, 72, 75, 124; SPP-CPL, 1999), art.34, para.2, 81, 83, 99; SAPL
(2005), art.16, 2nd period (penalty), art.38 (summons and interrogation); MPS Rules (1998), arts. 62, 109,
127 (arts. 128 and 129 stipulate the extension of time limits stipulated by art.127).
176 See CPL 1996, art.73; SPP-CPL 1999, arts. 83, 85, 96; MPS Rules 1998, arts. 135 and 150; SAPL
2005, art.39; RETL Guidelines 1982, art.12; 中华人民共和国行政复议法 (PRC Administrative
Reconsideration Law, hereafter ARL), 29 April 1999, art.6, para. 2.
177 SCL 1994, art.3, para.1, art.15, sections 1 and 2;中华人民共和国民法通则 (PRC General Principles
of Civil Law), 12 April 1986, arts. 119 and 121.
178 Tong 2004, p. 31.
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slavery, kidnapping, but also those of other state organs, for example through
disciplinary measures initiated by city administration staff, local village govern-
ments or the Party, or through the use of RETL as a substitute for formal arrest and
prosecution.
It is worthwhile to note that China’s incarcerated population, is thought to be
“roughly in line with international norms”,179 well behind the US and Russia.
Whether or not this situation will remain is a big question. Approved criminal
arrests lie above 900,000 prisoners year, and a conservative estimate of about
350,000 in different forms of administrative or reformative deprivation of liberty,
along with about 1.5 million prison inmates makes the number of incarcerated in
China to about 2,750,000 persons, putting the Mainland’s incarcerated population at
about 210 prisoners 100,000 people, above an estimated East Asian average of 167,
but well below the former Soviet Central Asian states at 292.180
However, considering the weaknesses in the Chinese legal system with regard to
procedural guarantees to prevent arbitrariness in deprivation of liberty as described
above, in light of the sizeable estimates of people deprived of their liberty outside
prison populations, we find that there is a huge potential for error. Furthermore,
there is a very strong belief in the reformative value of incarceration (at the same
time that it fulfills the need to show strong punitive measures) and facing increasing
crime, it is not very likely that the number of persons deprived of their liberty will
be less as time passes by, making the establishment of functional control
mechanisms even more important, in particular as administrative measures of
incarceration remains an important tool for the public security agencies for fighting
crime and maintaining public order.
These issues seen in relation to a formalistic legal framework and weak
guarantees against arbitrariness, leaves the right to liberty of person under article 37
vulnerable to violations despite broad legislative basis, as would be the case with
most other rights within the Chinese constitution.
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